Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019)
Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.
It would be interesting to look at other Soviet operations for data on damaged vs destroyed. There are several conceivable explanations for the lower repaired to destroyed ratio for the Soviet units at Kursk. Some examples:
a) The Germans advanced and controlled the battlefield for much of the time.
b) German AT weapons may have been more effective.
c) According to some sources, the Germans often continued to fire at a disabled enemy tank until it burned.
d) Differences in recovery and repair services
If we would obtain similar data for operations when the Red Army advanced, we could perhaps see to what extent explanation a) is relevant to explain the difference between German and Soviet rates at Kursk.
I read with interest, could I ask, do you have a view on the number of Panzer Crew casualties from your analysis work. The number of US, British and Commonwealth and Russian casualties are known from original sources which gives an insight to method and doctrine. I ask, having watched an interesting conversation with the Director of the Panzer Museum, he has yet to find the detail. Associated with this, I am reading Richard Holmes Battlefields of the Second World War, where he explains the different approaches between armies from democracies and those from totalitarian states, who are prepared to take higher casualties to achieve their objectives. Given the videos quotes Russian casualties are 300,000 from 400,000 tank crew which is a mind boggling number, whilst the US Army crew fatalities are around 1,500. Were Germany Panzer Units casualties consistent with those of a totalitarian state, ie Russian rates. Or considering the Dupuy performance analysis on German unit fighting abilities, typically 50% better than similar US and Commonwealth units under all circumstances, does his work consider the Tank units and Russian units.
Video https://youtu.be/Jw_gutZZXnc
>>>I read with interest, could I ask, do you have a view on the number of Panzer Crew casualties from your analysis work
Perhaps I can answer this question.
1. Where does this quote come from?
“Russian casualties are the quotes of 300,000 from 400,000 tank crews, which is a mind boggling number, whilst the US Army crew fatalities are around 1,500.”
2. Under normal conditions, the ratio of KIA and MIA was 1.5-1.7 crewman for the irretrievably lost T-34 (T-34/76), and about 0.8 for the T-70 tank.
I confirm, a significant part of the tankmans died outside the tanks.
If the statistics of are exceeded, it is possible, without looking at Reports to assume the loss of tanks in the depth of the enemy’s defense and a large number of MIA.
P.S. I collected statistics on 238 burnt T-34, 3 KV, 40 T-70 and 1 SU-85
Hi, there is a YouTube link to an interview with the Director of the Panzer Museum, this the quote for Russian Tankers. https://youtu.be/G-Z2eV72iv4 This is the interview where the number of American Tankers was explained. The document is on line and confirmed the number. Casualties that is a different thing. 21st Army Group has a similar number, though higher because it includes officers also explained. They had the Operational Research unit which followed the battle. This was brought together in the famous US Army study.
I have hardly ever seen aggregated data on German tank crew losses. Alfred Rubbel states that the s.Pz.Abt. 503 lost 206 tank company members killed or missing during the war. However, one of the most interesting observations made by him is that in most cases, the crew members lost were usually killed outside their tanks. Possibly this can be more frequent in Tiger formations than in ordinary tank units equipped with Pz III och Pz IV tanks, but it is nevertheless an interesting observation.
Niklas, thank you, interesting quote from Alfred Rubbel, I understand they lost around 113 Tigers in action, so whilst crude that is around 1.8/ tank, I recall the US Army is around 0.98/Tank whilst the Commonwealth Army’s around 1.2/Tank. So given the ferocity of the Eastern Front combat and the use of Tiger to firefight 1.8/tank is plausible. Whether, that can be extrapolated across all units is questionable. It is an interesting observation, from Alfred Rubbel, and consistent with the post war analysis by the US Army, arguably the safest place was within the metal box. Though, an interesting finding was the high mortality of Commonwealth tank commanders, due to head wounds. Similar to German crews, they typically had Berets not helmets like the US Army crews.
Thank you again.
I suspect the 206 members killed or missing during the war included maintenance and support personnel, not just “tankers.” Also, the figures of 206 people are killed and missing while the count of 113 Tigers lost I am guessing are tanks destroyed.
The figure of 0.98 crew casualties per tank comes from Trevor Dupuy’s book Attrition, page 80. A casualty certainly means killed, WOUNDED or missing. I am not sure what they mean by a “tank loss” except it states “Data is provided on 898 tanks (797 medium and 101 light) rendered inoperable by enemy action. The data show tanks losses by cause and indicates if the tanks burned.”
On page 81 of Attrition it breaks the data down to two “tank loss type” categories, burned (1.28 crew casualties per loss) and not burned (0.78 crew casualties per loss).
All this data is based upon the U.S. First Army from June 1944-April 1945.
The 206 killed and missing were members of the tank companies, not any other parts of the battalion (which were estimated by Rubbel).
Yes but 206/113 does not get you to a figure that is comparable to 0.98 for the U.S. It is clear that the U.S. figure is crew lost per tank. The 206 figure includes killed who were not crewmen (
may be the majority of them), it does not include wounded, and of course, the 113 tanks counted were only those written off as destroyed, which could be less than 10% of the tanks damaged. Lots of tanks get damaged and there is a casualty or two as a result (I can give specific examples of that…like Rosen at Kursk).That is the point i wanted to make in my subsequent post. Unless it is very clearly specified what the figure actually represents, it is hard to make any use of it.
Obviously crew members can be killed or wounded even if the tank is not destroyed, for example from spalling when the armour is not penetrated.
To make it useful, it will have to refer to killed or wounded when hit by enemy fire, perhaps subdivided into cases when the tank is destroyed or damaged. Furthermore, I suspect there may be considerable differences between various tank model. This makes me shy away from such statistics. However, if Trevors figures refer to damaged and destroyed, respectively, tanks in the US forces fighting in NW Europe 44-45, I would assume they are useful for that situation. I would not recommend extrapolating them to Soviet or German forces. And if, as Rubbels claim indicates, the majority of tank crew losses occurred outside the tanks, it is perhaps not hits on the tanks that are of greatest interest when assessing crew losses.
The tank companies in 503rd had an authorised strength of 88 officers, NCO and enlisted men. Given five crew members for each tank, that would mean that crews make up 70 of those 88.
Modified my last comment slightly.
For Kursk, I do have an interesting statement from Richard Rosen (also of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion). It is on page 1128 of my book. It says “I do have a list of the personnel losses in our 3rd company:
July 6….near Krutoi Log………………..2 dead
……….near Batratskaya Dacha………….4 dead
July 8…..near Myasoyedovo………………1 dead
July 11…???…………………………..1 dead
July 12…???…………………………..1 dead
He then states “This includes some soldiers from our maintenance echelon, who had come to the front to carry our repairs on our tanks and were killed during enemy artillery raids.”
Keep in mind, Rosen’s figures are only for the 3rd company. For the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion I have them with a strength of 38 Tigers at the start (5 July), with a total of 40 committed to the battle. Their losses were 70 damaged and 5 destroyed. See page 1339 of my book.
I am somewhat sceptical about a statistic about crew losses per tank lost. If it refers to actual crew losses that occurs when the tank is hit, that may be OK, but if we produce some average by dividing the number of losses in a tank unit over a (perhaps long) period of time with the number of tanks destroyed, then I am very sceptical. As tanks in many cases are permanently lost not directly due to enemy fire, it may result in strange figures. Also, as tank crew losses (as indicated by Rubbel) often occur when the crew members are not in their tanks, figures can become even stranger. If tanks that are rendered inoperable but not destroyed are included, it may become even more strange.
If Dupuy’s figures refer to US 1st Army in 1944-45, few tanks were lost by abandonment and other causes that did not involve hits from enemy units. Hence, they may not be comparable to losses caused in other ways.
All in all, I don’t see the usefulness of a crew member loss per tank lost ratio, at least not with present day information.
<< If it refers to actual crew losses that occurs when the tank is hit, that may be OK... >>
I think that is what Trevor Dupuy’s figure in Attrition does refer to, although it may not have picked up all lightly damaged tanks (although it does address some tanks lost to mines).
<< All in all, I don’t see the usefulness of a crew member loss per tank lost ratio, at least not with present day information.>>
I think it is useful for some combat models and some wargames. We have never done anything on it besides the survey from the U.S. First Army.