An Errant Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade (versus Staudegger?)

Interesting account from Valerii Zamulin’s book, pages 145-146, on the actions of the 99th Tank Brigade on 8 July 1943 (part of the late arriving II Tank Corps):

…the attack went in at 1400 8 July 1943. The 99th Tank Brigade attacked in the second echelon, behind the 169th and 26th Tank Brigades, with a combat formation also in two echelons: in the first–the T-34 tanks, in the second–the T-70 tanks. A motorized rifle battalion and an anti-tank rifle company rode into battle aboard the tanks….the brigade went into battle in the designated direction Hill 258.2–Teterevino–Luchki….

The commander of the 1st Tank Battalion, which was to attack in the brigade’s first echelon behind the 169th Tank Brigade, even as he was deploying the battalion at the jumping-off line for the attack (the railroad hut 500 meters north of Ivanovskii Vyselok), took a wrong turn and wound up 2 kilometers south of Ivanovskii Vyselok….the 1st Tank Battalion was halted, and it was assigned a different direction–to attack the southwest edge of the grove on the Komsomolets State Farm….

In the vicinity of the highway, the 1st Tank Battalion bumped into the 26th Tank Brigade’s column, although the battalon commader knew that the 26th Tank Brigade was supposed to operating on his right. Then the 1st Tank Battalion commander turned his column and began to attack along the shoulder of the highway in the direction of Tetevino. On the appooach to Hill 258.2, the battalion came under fire from two Panzer VI enemy tanks. An exchange of fire erupted, and the 1st Tank Battalion, suffering tank losses, fell back to the western edge of the woods on the Komsomolets State Farm and fired from its positon there.

So…..going back to our Staudegger discussion on 8 July: on stopping a tank brigade of 60 tanks and killing 22 of them:

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 3

II Tank Corps on 8 July 1943

It could have been:

  1. Staudegger could have ended up engaging both the tanks of the 26th Tank Brigade and the I Battalion/99th Tank Brigade
    1. This would put him against over 60 tanks.
      1. The 26th Tank Brigade had at least 20 T-34s and 20 T-70s.
      2. The I Battalion/99th Tank Brigade may have had around 10-11 T-34s and 10 T-70s.
        1. This assumes one company of T-34s and one company of T-70s.
        2. It could have had three companies.
        3. The 99th Tank Brigade had at least 31 T-34s and 21 T-70s.
    2. This would have explained more of his losses
      1. The 26th Tank Brigade lost at least 6 T-34s tanks this day (and 3 T-70s) .
      2. The 99th Tank Brigade either lost:
        1. At least 12 T-34s and 4 T-70s this day (Fond: 3407, Opis: 1, Delo: 108)
        2. or 21 T-34s and 2 T-70s this day (Zamulin, page 148).
          1. The two T-70s were lost in the II Battalion (Zamulin, page 146)
        3. Don’t know how many losses were in the I Battalion vice the II Battalion (which was also engaged).
        4. It is possible that many T-34s were lost in the I Battalion.
          1. We do not know the composition of the I Battalion, but it may have been 10 T-34s and 10 T-70s.
    3. Staudegger was by himself while the Soviet report states there were two Panzer VIs.
      1. Could be a mistake in the Soviet report.
      2. Or Staudegger had help (there was one other broken down LSSAH Tiger in Teterevino).
      3. Or could be Das Reich Tiger tanks (they had a company with around 6 Tigers ready for action as of 7 July).
        1. They may have lost all six of these tanks on 8 July, including 1 destroyed.
  2. It could be that Staudegger just engaged the I Battalion
    1. It does not appear that he stopped the 26th Gds Tank Bde
  3. The claim of killing 22 T-34s still looks high for this day
    1. 26th Tank Bde lost at least 6 T-34s
    2. 99th Tank Bde lost between 12 and 21 T-34s.
      1. The I Battalion may have only had 10 T-34s.
    3. The German infantry killed at least 2.
    4. Other parts of the Das Reich SS Division were in the area. I assume they did something. They were facing the rest of the 99th Gds Tank Bde.
  4. It is possible that the report of two Tigers engaging the lost I Battalion, 99th Gds Tank Bde is Staudegger.
    1. The Russians may have been seeing double.
    2. Or he may have had help.
    3. Or these two Tigers could have been from Das Reich (we assume that they were to the northwest with the rest of the panzer regiment).

Anyhow, still don’t have an answer, but getting closer.

As it is, I have revised the post “Revised Footnote on Staudegger.”

Revised Footnote on Staudegger

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.

Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.

His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019)

Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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