This text is pulled from pages 744-745 of my Kursk book.
A look at the German and Soviet tank losses since the start of the battle against the SS Panzer corps shows:
           SS Panzer Corps  Opposing Soviet    Exchange
Date   Tank Losses          Tank Losses         Ratio
5th       54 tanks                  30 tanks              1:0.56
6th       79                          149                        1:1.89
7th       55                            86                        1:1.56
8th        47                          164                         1:3.49
9th       34                          135                         1:3.97
10th       3                            55                         1:18.33
11th     16                             9                          1:0.56
          ——                      ——-
          288 tanks             628 tanks                   1:2.18
This comparison is a case where one should not place too much reliance in the day-to-day statistics. While the German losses, calculated as a decline in ready-for-action, are reasonably accurate during this period for each day and for each division; the Soviet records are not. Overall, the Soviets lost as many or more tanks during this period, as indicated here, but there is some question how many were lost on exactly which day.
For the record, 118 tanks were lost by the Adolf Hitler SS Division while they may have been responsible for 255 Soviet tank losses (a 1-to-2.16 exchange ratio), the Das Reich SS Division lost 104 tanks, while they may have been responsible for 274 Soviet tanks (a 1-to-2.63 exchange ratio). The Totenkopf SS Division did not get as much credit, for although it lost only 66 tanks, it is only credited with 99 tanks (a 1-to-1.50 exchange ratio). One much keep in mind that these formations were supported by air, artillery, and elements of the 167th Infantry Division and they certainly played a role in causing Soviet tank losses. Furthermore, the assignment of which Soviet units faces which German units is sometime questionable as the unit boundaries overlapped and sometimes the German units were operating in close coordination with each other.
The reverse comparison can also be made, although it is less clear as there were often two different tank corps facing the same German divisions and sometimes elements of the same tank corps facing two different German divisions,. Still, one can estimate that the XXXI Tank Corps lost 93 tanks while they may have been responsible for 15 German tanks (a 6.20-to-1 exchange ratio). The V Guards Tank Corps lost 166 while they may have been responsible for 62 German tanks (a 2.68-to-1 exchange ratio). The II Tank Corps lost 136 tanks while they may have been responsible for 34 German tanks (a 4.00-to-1 exchange ratio). Note that there is considerable overlap between these three formations and their opponents. Adding them together produces 395 Soviet tanks lost while they may have been responsible for 111 German tanks lost. this is a 3.56-to-1 exchange ratio. Finally, the carefully husbanded II Guards Tank Corps lost 48 tanks while they may have been responsible for taking out 32 German tanks (a 1.50-to-1 exchange ratio).
The 10th is just odd, the same applies for the 17th to 18th exchange rates in the Kursk database. I am sure that some of those losses may have been late registrations of losses which occurred days before.
Antony Watson tweeted this response:
Interesting question – strategic Soviet dominance prevailed despite nominal losses far in excess of the enemy – that in turn did not possess the force size to initiate the original attack against well prepared defences and several echelon deep defensive formations.
https://twitter.com/Wattoant/status/1029375408276480000
An interesting thread on Twitter on efforts to maintain morale in the Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division at Kursk:
https://twitter.com/PGDivGD/status/1030432080898007040