After discussing with Chris the series of recent posts on the subject of breakpoints, it seemed appropriate to provide a better definition of exactly what a breakpoint is.
Dorothy Kneeland Clark was the first to define the notion of a breakpoint in her study, Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion (Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University: Baltimore, 1954). She found it was not quite as clear-cut as it seemed and the working definition she arrived at was based on discussions and the specific combat outcomes she found in her data set [pp 9-12].
DETERMINATION OF BREAKPOINT
The following definitions were developed out of many discussions. A unit is considered to have lost its combat effectiveness when it is unable to carry out its mission. The onset of this inability constitutes a breakpoint. A unit’s mission is the objective assigned in the current operations order or any other instructional directive, written or verbal. The objective may be, for example, to attack in order to take certain positions, or to defend certain positions.
How does one determine when a unit is unable to carry out its mission? The obvious indication is a change in operational directive: the unit is ordered to stop short of its original goal, to hold instead of attack, to withdraw instead of hold. But one or more extraneous elements may cause the issue of such orders:
(1) Some other unit taking part in the operation may have lost its combat effectiveness, and its predicament may force changes, in the tactical plan. For example the inability of one infantry battalion to take a hill may require that the two adjoining battalions be stopped to prevent exposing their flanks by advancing beyond it.
(2) A unit may have been assigned an objective on the basis of a G-2 estimate of enemy weakness which, as the action proceeds, proves to have been over-optimistic. The operations plan may, therefore, be revised before the unit has carried out its orders to the point of losing combat effectiveness.
(3) The commanding officer, for reasons quite apart from the tactical attrition, may change his operations plan. For instance, General Ridgway in May 1951 was obliged to cancel his plans for a major offensive north of the 38th parallel in Korea in obedience to top level orders dictated by political considerations.
(4) Even if the supposed combat effectiveness of the unit is the determining factor in the issuance of a revised operations order, a serious difficulty in evaluating the situation remains. The commanding officer’s decision is necessarily made on the basis of information available to him plus his estimate of his unit’s capacities. Either or both of these bases may be faulty. The order may belatedly recognize a collapse which has in factor occurred hours earlier, or a commanding officer may withdraw a unit which could hold for a much longer time.
It was usually not hard to discover when changes in orders resulted from conditions such as the first three listed above, but it proved extremely difficult to distinguish between revised orders based on a correct appraisal of the unit’s combat effectiveness and those issued in error. It was concluded that the formal order for a change in mission cannot be taken as a definitive indication of the breakpoint of a unit. It seemed necessary to go one step farther and search the records to learn what a given battalion did regardless of provisions in formal orders…
CATEGORIES OF BREAKPOINTS SELECTED
In the engagements studied the following categories of breakpoint were finally selected:
|
Category of Breakpoint |
No. Analyzed |
|
I. Attack [Symbol] rapid reorganization [Symbol] attack |
9 |
|
II. Attack [Symbol] defense (no longer able to attack without a few days of recuperation and reinforcement |
21 |
|
III. Defense [Symbol] withdrawal by order to a secondary line |
13 |
|
IV. Defense [Symbol] collapse |
5 |
Disorganization and panic were taken as unquestionable evidence of loss of combat effectiveness. It appeared, however, that there were distinct degrees of magnitude in these experiences. In addition to the expected breakpoints at attack [Symbol] defense and defense [Symbol] collapse, a further category, I, seemed to be indicated to include situations in which an attacking battalion was ‘pinned down” or forced to withdraw in partial disorder but was able to reorganize in 4 to 24 hours and continue attacking successfully.
Category II includes (a) situations in which an attacking battalion was ordered into the defensive after severe fighting or temporary panic; (b) situations in which a battalion, after attacking successfully, failed to gain ground although still attempting to advance and was finally ordered into defense, the breakpoint being taken as occurring at the end of successful advance. In other words, the evident inability of the unit to fulfill its mission was used as the criterion for the breakpoint whether orders did or did not recognize its inability. Battalions after experiencing such a breakpoint might be able to recuperate in a few days to the point of renewing successful attack or might be able to continue for some time in defense.
The sample of breakpoints coming under category IV, defense [Symbol] collapse, proved to be very small (5) and unduly weighted in that four of the examples came from the same engagement. It was, therefore, discarded as probably not representative of the universe of category IV breakpoints,* and another category (III) was added: situations in which battalions on the defense were ordered withdrawn to a quieter sector. Because only those instances were included in which the withdrawal orders appeared to have been dictated by the condition of the unit itself, it is believed that casualty levels for this category can be regarded as but slightly lower than those associated with defense [Symbol] collapse.
In both categories II and III, “‘defense” represents an active situation in which the enemy is attacking aggressively.
* It had been expected that breakpoints in this category would be associated with very high losses. Such did not prove to be the case. In whatever way the data were approached, most of the casualty averages were only slightly higher than those associated with category II (attack [Symbol] defense), although the spread in data was wider. It is believed that factors other than casualties, such as bad weather, difficult terrain, and heavy enemy artillery fire undoubtedly played major roles in bringing about the collapse in the four units taking part in the same engagement. Furthermore, the casualty figures for the four units themselves is in question because, as the situation deteriorated, many of the men developed severe cases of trench foot and combat exhaustion, but were not evacuated, as they would have been in a less desperate situation, and did not appear in the casualty records until they had made their way to the rear after their units had collapsed.
In 1987-1988, Trevor Dupuy and colleagues at Data Memory Systems, Inc. (DMSi), Janice Fain, Rich Anderson, Gay Hammerman, and Chuck Hawkins sought to create a broader, more generally applicable definition for breakpoints for the study, Forced Changes of Combat Posture (DMSi, Fairfax, VA, 1988) [pp. I-2-3]
The combat posture of a military force is the immediate intention of its commander and troops toward the opposing enemy force, together with the preparations and deployment to carry out that intention. The chief combat postures are attack, defend, delay, and withdraw.
A change in combat posture (or posture change) is a shift from one posture to another, as, for example, from defend to attack or defend to withdraw. A posture change can be either voluntary or forced.
A forced posture change (FPC) is a change in combat posture by a military unit that is brought about, directly or indirectly, by enemy action. Forced posture changes are characteristically and almost always changes to a less aggressive posture. The most usual FPCs are from attack to defend and from defend to withdraw (or retrograde movement). A change from withdraw to combat ineffectiveness is also possible.
Breakpoint is a term sometimes used as synonymous with forced posture change, and sometimes used to mean the collapse of a unit into ineffectiveness or rout. The latter meaning is probably more common in general usage, while forced posture change is the more precise term for the subject of this study. However, for brevity and convenience, and because this study has been known informally since its inception as the “Breakpoints” study, the term breakpoint is sometimes used in this report. When it is used, it is synonymous with forced posture change.
Hopefully this will help clarify the previous discussions of breakpoints on the blog.
RIchard A Fox, in his book Archaeology, History, and Custer’s Last Stand, states he has developed a
“theoretical model of combat, called the stability / deconstruction model, that casts combat behavior within an archaeological framework. I design methods to link the model with patterns in the material remains of battle. In this way, combat behaviors in time and space can be exposed, and battle events can be explicated and explained.” (page 7 in the Kindle Edition.)
I think his model is more of a mental one because he does not list any equations and it relies more on the disposition of indicators of unit and personnel positioning from artifacts; in this case mostly shell casings and spent bullets.
An internet search did not really turn up a seperate listing on his model.
Here are some highlights I found interesting.
On page 9-10, he writes an interesting paragraph:
“In battle, there is never a guarantee of success. Though an army engaged in combat, or its constituent military units, may maintain tactical stability and still be defeated, defeat comes far more commonly through disintegration of the unity imposed by tactics. Above all, commanders fear disintegration in combat. When tactical stability disintegrates, commanders lose the power to maneuver subordinates and maintain control. Fearful and panicky, soldiers fend for themselves, and usually not by resisting. Defeat is almost certain; success is impossible. This view of behavior in combat provides a model of tactical stability and disintegration.
The factors at work in maintaining stability and preventing disintegration in a combat environment are of intense concern to military theoreticians.”
He cites bunching as a symptom of a loss of stability, as well as received lack of support (whether from other units, supporting fires, logistics, etc.). Loss of confidence in commanders is alluded to, as in Reno apparently panicking as he vacillates and withdraws from his skirmish line position and his movement to his defensive position.
He cites various observations form SLA Marshal and Du Picq.
He briefly discusses breaking points on page 50:
“But the legitimate breaking point is seldom reached, since perceptions induced by combat stress usually overwhelm reality. Thus the “right” to flee becomes a major factor in promptin disintegration, even under the most ludicrous situations.”
He then goes on to describe an incident where elements of the 7th Cavalry “broke” at Wounded Knee where some fled at the sound of the first shots of gunfire from the village. (page 50 again).
While at several points in the book, he talks about odds (force ratios) and casualties, these do not appear to provide an input to his model because they do not provide the hard evidence he is looking for in terms of artifacts that can be linked to individual behavior – primarily in this case following individuals across the battlefield based on cartridge cases – but also by the position and density of ejected cartridge cases (indicating a firing position) and of spent bullets (indicating a target and providing a measure of direction and distance of the opposed firing line.) A cluster of bullets and a dearth of ejected cartridges can indicate a lack of opposition or the use of revolvers by the defenders who then do not have time to reload. Similarly, the use of hand held weapons is not detected. (Arrowheads also appear in some arrays, but not in a high density although there are accounts of many being loosed. This could be because they are recovered after the battle.)
It provides an interesting look at a unit that breaks but it may not directly provide a combat model useful to us or improve one’s ability to model stability/destruction based on non-archaeological information.