One of the least studied aspects of combat is battle termination. Why do units in combat stop attacking or defending? Shifts in combat posture (attack, defend, delay, withdrawal) are usually voluntary, directed by a commander, but they can also be involuntary, as a result of direct or indirect enemy action. Why do involuntary changes in combat posture, known as breakpoints, occur?
As Chris pointed out in a previous post, the topic of breakpoints has only been addressed by two known studies since 1954. Most existing military combat models and wargames address breakpoints in at least a cursory way, usually through some calculation based on personnel casualties. Both of the breakpoints studies suggest that involuntary changes in posture are seldom related to casualties alone, however.
Current U.S. Army doctrine addresses changes in combat posture through discussions of culmination points in the attack, and transitions from attack to defense, defense to counterattack, and defense to retrograde. But these all pertain to voluntary changes, not breakpoints.
Army doctrinal literature has little to say about breakpoints, either in the context of friendly forces or potential enemy combatants. The little it does say relates to the effects of fire on enemy forces and is based on personnel and material attrition.
According to ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols, an enemy combat unit is considered suppressed after suffering 3% personnel casualties or material losses, neutralized by 10% losses, and destroyed upon sustaining 30% losses. The sources and methodology for deriving these figures is unknown, although these specific terms and numbers have been a part of Army doctrine for decades.
The joint U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps vision of future land combat foresees battlefields that are highly lethal and demanding on human endurance. How will such a future operational environment affect combat performance? Past experience undoubtedly offers useful insights but there seems to be little interest in seeking out such knowledge.
Trevor Dupuy criticized the U.S. military in the 1980s for its lack of understanding of the phenomenon of suppression and other effects of fire on the battlefield, and its seeming disinterest in studying it. Not much appears to have changed since then.
Clearly breakpoints are crucial when modelling battlefield combat. I have read extensively about it using mostly first hand accounts of battles rather than high level summaries. Some of the major factors causing it appear to be loss of leadership (e.g. Harald’s death at Hastings), loss of belief in the units capacity to achieve its objectives (e.g. the retreat of the Old Guard at Waterloo, surprise often figured in Mongol successes, over confidence resulting in impetuous attacks which fail dramatically (e.g. French attacks at Agincourt and Crecy), loss of control over the troops (again Crecy and Agincourt) are some of the main ones I can think of off hand.
The break-point crisis seems to occur against a background of confusion, disorder, mounting casualties, increasing fatigue and loss of morale. Casualties are part of the background but not usually the actual break point itself.
Perhaps a way forward in the short term is to review a number of first hand battle accounts (I am sure you can think of many) and calculate the percentage of times these factors and others appear as breakpoints in the literature. You can probably sit down with pencil and paper and list them from your extensive knowledge of the history. I expect that list would prove reliable.
For a more in-depth analysis the psychology literature, especially sports psychology (competitive sports), would probably yield insights. So it may be worth a review of the literature in that field to develop an intellectual model.
While this has not been studied by the military I am not convinced that that is a blocker at all. The issue is not actually terribly complex as it is something that people experience in a minor way in everyday life as well as in major military conflicts. At some stage is it all gets too much and we walk away from something – a defeat syndrome. The psychology of this defeat syndrome in personal life would also yield a number of insights. Again I expect you would find the literature of psychology to be helpful.
Based on these insights you could probably develop an intellectual model and apply it to battle statistics as a hypothesis that can be tested against history. You could then have a reasonable model without having to conduct original research. I’m not sure that original research can actually yield many answers. What I have described may be the most practical approach and probably would yield and reasonable outcome. The final result would be a significant advance over what we know now that could be tested and improved over time.
Why wait for the military to do something? You will die of old age before that happens!
Clinton….OK, responded to you comment with a blog post (Response 3). Hopefully, this answers your question.
I’m just going to throw out some random thoughts here in sort of a stream of thought. Probably not much help, but anyway here we go.
Do units/sides break more early in military history (when the battlefield were more compact and setbacks more visible) or in modern times?
Do they start in the “rear” or in the “front” or in the “middle”? At the bottom or the top?
It seems one way a unit can break is if the commander is seen to break or perhaps is killed. For example, Reno’s squadron at the Little Big Horn. Or Darius versus Alexander. Archaeology seems to show Custer’s Squadron broke by analyzing the pattern of ejected shells, but Nathaniel Philbrick The Last Stand seems to posit they were trying to fight through.
Did the British break at Isandlwana? Interpenetration by the Zulus plus running out of ammunition? Why not at Rorke’s Drift? Field Fortifications?
Is there any evidence of breakpoints in naval combat? A ship is brave if the captain is brave. Taffy 3? Did the Japanese commander break? What about aerial combat?
Early in the Revolution, American troops broke “fairly often” until perhaps they were better trained and equipped (perhaps with bayonets) and leaders emerged.
Is there any evidence of Japanese units breaking in the Pacific War? We speak a lot about Japanese units fighting to the end, but there are accounts (perhaps many?) of US units doing so.
It is interesting to contrast the defense of the Philippines and their surrender with the British at Singapore.
hmmm, my thought stream seems to have gone dry…
Interesting stream of thought. The word “breakpoints” is simply a convenient short-hand for “Forced Changes in Posture.” So while the classic breakpoint is a unit breaking up and streaming to the rear, there are many forced changes in posture that do not include that. An attacker can go from attacking to a halt (especially if under heavy fire), a defender can go from defending to withdrawal (especially if flanked). Often the commander is involved in this process. A breakpoint can be involuntary (for example, a rout) or voluntary (the attacking commander calls off an attack).