The Military Reform Debate (1982)

Continuing chronologically through the box that was supposed to be trash….next item is a “background pamphlet” for Senior Conference XX: The Military Reform Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century, dated 3-5 June 1982. It is 228 pages.

Interesting time period, new president, defense budgets were back on the upswing….so what are they saying? Papers presented in that rather thick book are:

  1. The Challenge of Military Reform by Captain Timothy L. Lupfer
  2. The Case for Maneuver by William S. Lind
  3. Toward a New American Approach to Warfare by Lt. Col. Huba Wass de Czege
  4. The Case for More Effective, Less Expensive Weapon Systems: What “Quality versus Quantity” Issue? by Pierre M. Sprey
  5. The Quantity versus Quality Quandry by William J. Perry
  6. Heavy and Light Ground Forces in the Context of U.S. Grand Strategy by Jeffrey Record
  7. Heavy versus Light Forces: A Question of Balance by John D. Mayer, Jr.
  8. Deficits and the Future of the All Volunteer Force by Major Thomas W. Fagan

Hmmm…looks a little bit like deja vu all over again. I think I will keep it.

One paragraph did footnote a Trevor Dupuy article in Army: “U.S. Military Strategy Has Been Getting a Bum Rap” (September 1980). The paragraph was in the Huba Wass de Czege article and states (page 49):

“It was often been stated that the ‘reformers” are misinformed. At least one noted historian [Dupuy] has taken them to task for their selective use of history. Many “reformers” picture the American tradition of war very selectively.”

Of course, that was way back in 1982.

 

P.S.: Turns out that this report is available on-line at the Hathi Trust Digital Library: https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/002589401

 

 

 

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.

Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.

His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019)

Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

Articles: 1455

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4 Comments

  1. I’m interested to read those two articles on “Quantity vs Quality” by Pierre Sprey and and William J. Perry. Sprey was part of the so-called “fighter mafia” at the Pentagon in the 1970’s, advocating John Boyd’s Energy-Maneuverability theory. Their emphasis on maneuverability led to the F-15 and F-16, pretty successful aircraft, no doubt. They advocated against advanced electronics and missile weaponry, however, so their lasting influence seems to be debatable (from wikipedia). I just listened to a “War College” podcast with a former Marine captain who credits Boyd for influence in a lot of USMC doctrine. Is this true?

    • Thanks Chris and Shawn for the links (silly me for missing them on the first read!). I read Mr. Sprey’s article, and it was thought provoking. So of his points stood the test of time, others seem to be simply inaccurate. The great irony is that he calls out the ability to achieve surprise as a key principal of aerial warfare, I believe that this is undisputed. One key feature of the massively expensive fifth generation fighters (certainly “high-quality” vs “high-quantity”) is their unparalleled ability to achieve surprise, at least until their stealth is compromised. I will read the other article on Quality vs Quantity and see if any principles can be distilled from that.

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