Attrition In Future Land Combat

Soldiers with Battery C, 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division maneuver their Paladins through Hohenfels Training Area, Oct. 26. Photo Credit: Capt. John Farmer, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cav

Last autumn, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley asserted that “we are on the cusp of a fundamental change in the character of warfare, and specifically ground warfare. It will be highly lethal, very highly lethal, unlike anything our Army has experienced, at least since World War II.” He made these comments while describing the Army’s evolving Multi-Domain Battle concept for waging future combat against peer or near-peer adversaries.

How lethal will combat on future battlefields be? Forecasting the future is, of course, an undertaking fraught with uncertainties. Milley’s comments undoubtedly reflect the Army’s best guesses about the likely impact of new weapons systems of greater lethality and accuracy, as well as improved capabilities for acquiring targets. Many observers have been closely watching the use of such weapons on the battlefield in the Ukraine. The spectacular success of the Zelenopillya rocket strike in 2014 was a convincing display of the lethality of long-range precision strike capabilities.

It is possible that ground combat attrition in the future between peer or near-peer combatants may be comparable to the U.S. experience in World War II (although there were considerable differences between the experiences of the various belligerents). Combat losses could be heavier. It certainly seems likely that they would be higher than those experienced by U.S. forces in recent counterinsurgency operations.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Defense Department has demonstrated a tenuous understanding of the phenomenon of combat attrition. Despite wildly inaccurate estimates for combat losses in the 1991 Gulf War, only modest effort has been made since then to improve understanding of the relationship between combat and casualties. The U.S. Army currently does not have either an approved tool or a formal methodology for casualty estimation.

Historical Trends in Combat Attrition

Trevor Dupuy did a great deal of historical research on attrition in combat. He found several trends that had strong enough empirical backing that he deemed them to be verities. He detailed his conclusions in Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (1987) and Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War (1995).

Dupuy documented a clear relationship over time between increasing weapon lethality, greater battlefield dispersion, and declining casualty rates in conventional combat. Even as weapons became more lethal, greater dispersal in frontage and depth among ground forces led daily personnel loss rates in battle to decrease.

The average daily battle casualty rate in combat has been declining since 1600 as a consequence. Since battlefield weapons continue to increase in lethality and troops continue to disperse in response, it seems logical to presume the trend in loss rates continues to decline, although this may not necessarily be the case. There were two instances in the 19th century where daily battle casualty rates increased—during the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War—before declining again. Dupuy noted that combat casualty rates in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War remained roughly the same as those in World War II (1939-45), almost thirty years earlier. Further research is needed to determine if average daily personnel loss rates have indeed continued to decrease into the 21st century.

Dupuy also discovered that, as with battle outcomes, casualty rates are influenced by the circumstantial variables of combat. Posture, weather, terrain, season, time of day, surprise, fatigue, level of fortification, and “all out” efforts affect loss rates. (The combat loss rates of armored vehicles, artillery, and other other weapons systems are directly related to personnel loss rates, and are affected by many of the same factors.) Consequently, yet counterintuitively, he could find no direct relationship between numerical force ratios and combat casualty rates. Combat power ratios which take into account the circumstances of combat do affect casualty rates; forces with greater combat power inflict higher rates of casualties than less powerful forces do.

Winning forces suffer lower rates of combat losses than losing forces do, whether attacking or defending. (It should be noted that there is a difference between combat loss rates and numbers of losses. Depending on the circumstances, Dupuy found that the numerical losses of the winning and losing forces may often be similar, even if the winner’s casualty rate is lower.)

Dupuy’s research confirmed the fact that the combat loss rates of smaller forces is higher than that of larger forces. This is in part due to the fact that smaller forces have a larger proportion of their troops exposed to enemy weapons; combat casualties tend to concentrated in the forward-deployed combat and combat support elements. Dupuy also surmised that Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of friction plays a role in this. The complexity of interactions between increasing numbers of troops and weapons simply diminishes the lethal effects of weapons systems on real world battlefields.

Somewhat unsurprisingly, higher quality forces (that better manage the ambient effects of friction in combat) inflict casualties at higher rates than those with less effectiveness. This can be seen clearly in the disparities in casualties between German and Soviet forces during World War II, Israeli and Arab combatants in 1973, and U.S. and coalition forces and the Iraqis in 1991 and 2003.

Combat Loss Rates on Future Battlefields

What do Dupuy’s combat attrition verities imply about casualties in future battles? As a baseline, he found that the average daily combat casualty rate in Western Europe during World War II for divisional-level engagements was 1-2% for winning forces and 2-3% for losing ones. For a divisional slice of 15,000 personnel, this meant daily combat losses of 150-450 troops, concentrated in the maneuver battalions (The ratio of wounded to killed in modern combat has been found to be consistently about 4:1. 20% are killed in action; the other 80% include mortally wounded/wounded in action, missing, and captured).

It seems reasonable to conclude that future battlefields will be less densely occupied. Brigades, battalions, and companies will be fighting in spaces formerly filled with armies, corps, and divisions. Fewer troops mean fewer overall casualties, but the daily casualty rates of individual smaller units may well exceed those of WWII divisions. Smaller forces experience significant variation in daily casualties, but Dupuy established average daily rates for them as shown below.

For example, based on Dupuy’s methodology, the average daily loss rate unmodified by combat variables for brigade combat teams would be 1.8% per day, battalions would be 8% per day, and companies 21% per day. For a brigade of 4,500, that would result in 81 battle casualties per day, a battalion of 800 would suffer 64 casualties, and a company of 120 would lose 27 troops. These rates would then be modified by the circumstances of each particular engagement.

Several factors could push daily casualty rates down. Milley envisions that U.S. units engaged in an anti-access/area denial environment will be constantly moving. A low density, highly mobile battlefield with fluid lines would be expected to reduce casualty rates for all sides. High mobility might also limit opportunities for infantry assaults and close quarters combat. The high operational tempo will be exhausting, according to Milley. This could also lower loss rates, as the casualty inflicting capabilities of combat units decline with each successive day in battle.

It is not immediately clear how cyberwarfare and information operations might influence casualty rates. One combat variable they might directly impact would be surprise. Dupuy identified surprise as one of the most potent combat power multipliers. A surprised force suffers a higher casualty rate and surprisers enjoy lower loss rates. Russian combat doctrine emphasizes using cyber and information operations to achieve it and forces with degraded situational awareness are highly susceptible to it. As Zelenopillya demonstrated, surprise attacks with modern weapons can be devastating.

Some factors could push combat loss rates up. Long-range precision weapons could expose greater numbers of troops to enemy fires, which would drive casualties up among combat support and combat service support elements. Casualty rates historically drop during night time hours, although modern night-vision technology and persistent drone reconnaissance might will likely enable continuous night and day battle, which could result in higher losses.

Drawing solid conclusions is difficult but the question of future battlefield attrition is far too important not to be studied with greater urgency. Current policy debates over whether or not the draft should be reinstated and the proper size and distribution of manpower in active and reserve components of the Army hinge on getting this right. The trend away from mass on the battlefield means that there may not be a large margin of error should future combat forces suffer higher combat casualties than expected.

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Shawn Woodford
Shawn Woodford

Shawn Robert Woodford, Ph.D., is a military historian with nearly two decades of research, writing, and analytical experience on operations, strategy, and national security policy. His work has focused on special operations, unconventional and paramilitary warfare, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, naval history, quantitative historical analysis, nineteenth and twentieth century military history, and the history of nuclear weapon development. He has a strong research interest in the relationship between politics and strategy in warfare and the epistemology of wargaming and combat modeling.

All views expressed here are his and do not reflect those of any other private or public organization or entity.

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9 Comments

  1. I was surprised by the comment “The U.S. Army currently does not have either an approved tool or a formal methodology for casualty estimation.” although I don’t doubt it. Why do you think such a vital area of military operations research is being ignored?

    Trevor Dupuy was a ground breaker in military operations research.

  2. I am surprised that “The U.S. Army currently does not have either an approved tool or a formal methodology for casualty estimation.”. Why do you think this is?

    Trevor Dupuy was a real ground breaker in military operations research.

  3. The greatest way of minimizing casualties is not to fight at all. Isolating dictatorships and defeating them with economic might is usually more effective but only applicable to democracies. Evidently, not in the face of invasion.

  4. What about a prognosis for the introduction of more and more unmanned systems and robots? Might that reduce combat casualties on the tactical level?

  5. The new version of WordPress does not appear to allow me to thread a reply to a specific comment, but this is in response to Mr. Reilly’s comment: I do not know why the Army has not made a greater effort to develop a casualty estimation methodology. The last significant research I am aware of was done by George Kuhn at the Logistics Management Institute in the late 80s. FM 1-0, linked to in the post, references Kuhn’s Benchmark Rate Structure (BRS), which is based on solid empirical research and is illuminating on casualty rate patterns. But it has not been adapted for use as a military staff estimation methodology. FM 1-0 simply tells S-1 staff to consult the BRS and use their judgement in developing a casualty estimate.

    My guess is that casualty estimates done at the DOD and combatant command level are based on wargaming and simulation. Trevor and Chris have well documented the problems with that approach.

    Casualty estimation is one of many aspects of combat phenomena that need serious research, but there seems to be a widespread lack of interest on pursuing them on the part of the U.S. government, the military services, or academia. I have no explanation as to why. Trevor Dupuy wrestled with this for nearly his entire career as an analyst.

  6. The question of the impact of unmanned vehicles and robots on casualty rates is an interesting one. Off the top of my head, I would say that until such weapons displace humans on the battlefield, the casualty rates won’t change much. If they do replace humans in combat, than personnel loss rates will drop, since there will be fewer people available to become casualties. For now, unmanned weapons systems appear to be used as additions, not replacements.

    It is also certainly possible that they will drive changes in tactics that take humans out of the line of fire, which would also decrease personnel loss rates. This would probably go hand in hand with displacing/replacing humans on the battlefield.

    • There might be an overall increase in the disparity between opposing factions in the future: A richer nation would be able to field unmanned systems to a larger degree, leading to even greater disproportionate losses. Robots are particularly useful in urbanized areas, which leads me to another question I wanted to ask the TDI: Are there any existing studies on city fighting in the TDI database?

      I am reading through the Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), USMC handbook and wondered if there is any information on street fighting engagements such as Aachen, Manila, Arnhem, Ortona, Ashrafiyeh, Quang Tri City, Ban Me Thuot, Beirut, Seoul, Sidon ,Berlin, Stalingrad, Cherbourg, Suez City, Hue, Tel Zaatar, Jerusalem, Tyre, Khorramshahr, Zahle etc.
      Of particular interest to me is the question of CEV disparity between forces. The difference between German vs Soviet forces and Israeli and Arab forces is known, did the effectiveness fluctuate or shift, i.e was there any “approximation” observed towards the defender?
      It is often stated (Soviet literature) that Soviet assault teams were able to outfight German city fighting units. There is little information on casualties for the city fighing itself (there is Kehrig and I do have the 6th armies diaries for the city fighting casualties for NCOs and other personnel up until the encirclement as well as information on Soviet losses from the Pamyat Naroda online archive, Grif Sekretnosti Sniat only gives total operation losses), it is hard to establish an overall picture.
      How did the battles stand in correlation to the “typical” contigencies? Time/Delay were obvious factors, feeding men into the city is of course decisive.

  7. TDI did an extensive study on urban combat in 2001-2002. You can find U-1 Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase I (Jan. 11, 2002) on the TDI website: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/urbanwar.pdf
    Chris summarizes the entire research project in his forthcoming book, War by Numbers. Many of the findings of this research run contrary to conventional wisdom about urban combat.

    TDI has also proposed conducting a study of urban combat in Stalingrad, but has not found someone willing to fund it yet.

    • Much appreciated.

      The topic is quite popular yet noone seems to be interested in any serious study, not even the Russians themselves. There are Col Glantz work in the Journal of Slavic military studies “The Struggle for Stalingrad City: Opposing Orders of Battle, Combat Orders and Reports, and Operational and Tactical Maps. Part 2: The Fight
      for Stalingrad’s Factory District-14 October–18 November 1942”
      and Stones “Stalingrad and the Evolution of Soviet Urban
      Warfare”.

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